Ninth Army
This video shows the Ninth Army's drive from Aachen to the Roer River. Although the video does not specifically describe the actions of the 67th Armored Regiment, it does address the contributions of the 2nd Armored Division in the drive to the Roer. The 2nd Armored Division is referenced nine times in this video. Here are the progress bar locations for 2nd Armored Division mentions: 6:23, 7:05, 7:53, 8:33, 9:04, 11:16, 12:14, 14:26, and 28:21. Although, the video does not offer comments about Operation Queen, it does address the kick-off of the drive to the Roer as 16 November...the same as Operation Queen. This video paints a very clear picture of the circumstances, the weather, the enemy, and the bravery of our troops.

2nd Armored Division

Prior to the launch of Operation Queen on 16 November, General Harmon emphasized to his commanders his philosophy of aggressive, fast, and daring thrusts.  He believed this approach would cost fewer lives than a gradual, nibbling movement toward objectives (Houston, 306).Shortly after midnight, assault units of both the 2nd Armored Division and the 29th Division began to move to their respective starting points.  Maintaining the secretiveness of the moves was difficult due to the noise generated by the tanks as well as the muddy and slippery conditions.  However, there was no indication that the enemy detected anything out of the ordinary...probably due to the dry runs conducted on the previous nights McDonald, p. 525).Preceding "H" hour, aerial strikes began at 11:15.  The airstrikes were delivered by 1,204 American and 1,188 British bombers (Houston, 307).  Although Juelich, Linnich, and Heinsberg suffered visible significant damage, there were questions about the impact of these bombings on the German war machinery. German prisoners of war reported that the strikes forced personnel to take cover but did not cause substantial casualties or damage to military machinery (MacDonald, p. 525).

The 2nd Armored Division assigned a two-mile front to attack.  Consequently, only one combat command was used in the initial attack.  Combat Command B was designated as the 2nd Armored Division attacking force.  Combat Command B was organized into three task forces. Task Force 1 was to take Loverich and Puffendorf.  Situated in the center, Task Force 2 was to capture Floverich and then support the capture of Apweiler.  Task Force X, situated to the north, was assigned the objective of capturing Immendorf and preventing the arrival of German reinforcements from Geilenkirchen (Houston, p. 307).

Task Force X consisted of a battalion of the 406th Infantry supported by Company H, 67th Armored Regiment (MacDonald, p.527).  During the period leading up to Operation Queen, Kenneth transitioned from Company D to Company H.  His letter postmarked 15 November (written on  13 November) shows that he was assigned to Company D.  However, on his letter postmarked 17 November (written on 15 November) his return address shows that he was assigned to Company H.  From these return addresses we know that Kenneth was assigned to Company H just one day prior to the commencement of Operation Queen.


2nd Armored Division

67th Armored Regiment As October turned to November inspections of all equipment were held. The Third Battalion continued to receive sporadic artillery fire with little damage. During this time, the Germans used a new type of assault on the Battalion (3rd) in the form of loudspeakers. The battalion was barraged with the propaganda themed, “So you thought you would be out of fox holes for Christmas.” By 16 November, the battalion learned that “H” hour would commence at 1245 A (History 67th Armored Regiment, p, 273). The Combat Command was divided into Task Force 1 consisting of the First and Second Battalions. The Third Battalion was assigned to Task Force 2 and "H" company was assigned to task Force "X" with the 406th Infantry's Second Battalion. The significance of Operation Queen was emphasized by the appearance of General Eisenhower, Lieutenant General Bradley, and Lieutenant General Simpson (History 67th Armored Regiment, p. 36). After a partially successful airstrike, the 1st and 2nd Battalions started operations in the vicinity of Beggendorf. The 1st Battalion was to attack Loverich as its immediate objective. The infantry followed the tanks and the town was cleared within a few minutes. The 2nd Battalion advanced through a minefield and by 1630 had established an outpost in the western part of Puffendorf. The 1st Battalion proceeded from Loverich and commenced mopping up operations in Puffendorf. Puffendorf now represented a wedge driven into enemy lines between Setterich (Setterich is about 1.26 miles from Puffendorf) to the southwest and Apweiler (Apweiler is about 1.17 miles from Puffendorf) to the north. The 3rd Battalion, with support from the 1st Battalion 41st Infantry and against artillery, mortar, and small arms fire took Floverich by 1313. At the end of the day, 8 tanks were lost. In action involving the 3rd Battalion, 300 enemy were taken prisoner with at least 100 killed. "H" company jumped off from Waurichen with Immendorf as its objective. In spite of heavy enemy and artillery fire, "H" Company captured its objective. Having to move through a minefield, "H" company lost four tanks. Two hundred were killed with 150 taken prisoner (History 67th Armored Regiment, p. 37-38).

67th Armored Regiment After Action Report 15 November 1944. (Verbatim). Task Force #1 remained on alert status prepared to move to assembly areas. The Right Force was unable to hold the high ground North of Puffendorf against superior number enemy force tanks and they slowly moved back to a defensive line along the North edge of Puffendorf. Task Force A of CCA was unable to make any progress against the heavy enemy opposition to the East of Puffendorf and they held a line along the SE and South of the town. It became apparent that the strong enemy armor force was attempting to retake Puffendorf. The situation at this time was very critical due to the losses Task Force #1 had taken. Orders were issued to hold Puffendorf. The general plan was for Task Force #1 to hold to the North and NE and for Task Force A of CCA to hold to the SE and South of the town. The Right Force consolidated their positions and the Left Force reorganized to the left of Right Force also along the North edge of town. Task Force #2 to our left also met heavy enemy armor and were unable to gain ground. Enemy artillery continued very heavy throughout the day. By 1300 our forces were holding the heavy enemy attack at a standstill, and the situation became less critical, allowing our forces to maneuver slightly to consolidate their positions. A 1513A, Battalion commanders were recalled to the Task Force FWD C.P. to go over plans for the defense of Puffendorf in conjunction with TASK Force "A" of CCA. Command was alerted to prepare for another enemy counter-attack in the early morning. At 2030A an enemy patrol of about a platoon strength attempted to penetrate our lines and were driven back by fire. Enemy artillery continued very active. Tank losses suffered up to this time by Task Force #1 was twenty-one (21) medium tanks and eleven (11) light tanks, most of which were not destroyed. Positive opinion of our commanders was that our medium tanks mounting 75mm guns were no match for the MK VI and MK V enemy tanks in a tank slugging battle. The medium tanks mounting the 76mm guns were fairly effective, and light tanks were no match at all, except for flank protection against smaller enemy guns and infantry. The 3" gun T.D.'s attached to Task Force #1 were effective against the MK VI and MK V enemy tanks. The T.D.'s mounting the new 90mm gun were very effective (67th AR After Action Reports).